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has taken place in the relationship of the corporation and its state of in-
corporation. Today many corporations do not engage in any economic
activity within their state of incorporation and the state serves only as a
depository for incorporation papers and as a franchise tax recipient. The
Freiday multi-venue option position diminishes the effect of this contem-
porary corporate situation and affords the plaintiff corporation venue
options based on contemporary economic activity, not 19th century eco-
nomic activity. It would seem that inherent in the Freiday multi-venue
option position is the realistic recognition that corporate residence is not
subject to the physical limitations that restrict the natural plaintiff's or
defendant's venue residence to a single forum. In addition to affording
contemporary plaintiff corporations realistic venue choices, the Freiday
multi-venue option position accomplishes at least two other desirable ends.
First, it allows a corporation federal use of non-resident jurisdiction
statutes outside its state of incorporation in districts in which it is engag-
ing in economic activity and such a statute is most likely to be useful.
Second, it affords a district court a better opportunity to make a mean-
ingful application of the recently restricted section 1404(a) change of
venue motion, because by numerically increasing the number of plaintiff
corporate venue choices it is likely that the number of proper transferee
forums will also be increased. If Congress did not intend for corpora-
tions to be able to lay proper venue in districts in which they are incor-
porated, licensed to do business or are doing business, it can clarify its
intent by statutory amendment.
PLANT REMOVAL AND THE SURVIVAL OF SENIORITY RIGHTS:
THE GLIDDEN CASE
The legal status of seniority rights earned under an expired collec-
tive bargaining agreement is in need of re-examination in light of the re-
cent case of Zdanok v. Glidden.' The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that seniority rights earned under a collective bargaining
agreement which provides for priority of recall on the basis of seniority
in the event of a layoff, but which fails to provide for the disposition of
these rights upon the termination of the agreement, are "vested" rights
which survive the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Seni-
1. 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 368 U.S. 814 (1962). The petition for
writ of certiorari was granted only on the question, "Does participation by a Court of
Claims judge vitiate the judgment of the Court of Appeals?" In all other respects the
petition for writ of certiorari was denied. 368 U.S. at 814.
NOTES
ority rights were thus, perhaps for the first time, accorded the status of a
"vested" property right.2  But more significant, the court also held that
seniority rights were legally binding upon the employer even though the
employer had for valid economic reasons terminated the employment re-
lationship in accordance with the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment and moved his plant to another location. Survival of seniority
rights in the event of plant removal and in the absence of an express pro-
vision to the contrary was found to be within the reasonable contempla-
tion of the parties and an implied condition of the collective bargaining
agreement. Employees possessing seniority rights under the expired
agreement were held entitled to damages resulting from the failure of the
defendant Glidden company to reemploy them at its new plant with their
old seniority status.
The Glidden decision cannot be discounted as a mere case of contract
interpretation with limited applicability resulting from the failure of the
parties to anticipate plant removal. Parties to a collective bargaining
agreement often leave specific problems unresolved when drafting the
written agreement.' The parties rely in such a case upon the grievance
machinery established by the agreement to settle any unanticipated or un-
resolved problems that may arise.4 In the Glidden case, however, plant
removal proved to be an issue which the parties to the agreement were
unable to resolve within the framework of the collective bargaining sys-
tem through the process of arbitration or additional collective bargaining.
The individual employees were thus forced to resort to the courts for a
resolution of the dispute with their employer. This, it is submitted, is
the significant aspect of the Glidden decision; for the end result of Glid-
den will not be to alter the legal status of seniority rights, but to force the
2. See, Local 2040 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Servel Inc., 268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959) ; System Fed'n No. 59 of Ry. Employees v. Loui-
siana & Ark. Ry., 119 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 656 (1941) ; Held
v. American Linen Supply Co., 6 Utah 2d 106, 307 P.2d 210 (1957) ; But cf. Piercy v.
Louisville & N. R.R., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923). Professor Cox, commenting
upon Piercy said: "Since seniority is not a vested property right, the decision is, on any
other interpretation of the facts, opposed to the overwhelming weight of authority."
Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601, 637 n. 98 (1955-56). The
court in Glidden, unlike the court in Piercy, did not hold that seniority rights were
"vested" to the extent that they could not be modified by the union without the express
consent of the individual employee. As pointed out by the court, "Of course the em-
ployee owning the right, or his authorized union agent, could bargain away the employee's
right." Zdanok v. Glidden, supra note 1 at 103. (Emphasis added). Seniority rights in
Glidden were held to be "vested" in the employee only to the extent that, absent a bar-
gaining away of the right by the individual employee or his union, it was a right of
which the employee could not be deprived by an unilateral action on the part of the
employer.
3. See Ryder, Some Concepts Concerning Grievance Procedure, 7 LAB. LAW J. 15,
16 (1956).
4. See Ryder, Some Concepts Concerning Grievatce Procedure, 7 LAB. LAw J. 15
(1956).
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issue of plant removal back into the collective bargaining system where
the union through collective bargaining will be in a position to protect
the employees' security of tenure.
Through the process of negotiation referred to as collective bargain-
ing, management and labor attempt to define the rights of one another
and embody them in a written agreement. The process is facilitated by
the National Labor Relations Act,' the basic policy of which is to en-
courage the settlement of labor disputes through collective bargaining.
The NLRA places the parties under a duty to bargain in respect to certain
subjects; namely, "wages, hours, and other conditions of employment."'
The parties are not required to reach agreement on a mandatory subject
of bargaining, but must bargain in good faith in an attempt to reach
agreement.7
The determination of rights under the agreement, however, depends
not so much on the duty to bargain as it does on the economic position
and bargaining power of the respective parties. Hence, if the union is
not satisfied with the offer of the employer and the subject is one about
which there is a mandatory duty to bargain, it may call a strike to enforce
its demands. The employer, on the other hand, has the economic weapon
of the lockout, or perhaps more realistically, the power to wait out the
union's attempt to force a concession. This is not to suggest that the
parties enjoy the "freedom of contract" considered so important to the
concept of mutuality and often attributed to the agreement or strike alter-
native.' The fact that the parties are under an obligation to bargain pre-
vents it from being a contract in the traditional sense. Moreover, to say
that a party may strike to enforce its demands is not always a realistic
alternative for a union.' Nonetheless, such alternatives do provide room
for a certain amount of give and take between the negotiating parties
and enable the union to effectively demand and obtain the recognition
of certain limited rights.
Another means utilized by management and labor to determine rights
under a collective bargaining agreement is the grievance procedure. The
process of collective bargaining provides the framework within which the
employment relationship functions. The grievance procedure attempts to
give body and meaning to the agreement and to provide a means by
which any dispute as to the meaning of the rights defined by the agree-
5. National Labor Relations Act, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
6. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), § 8(d), 61 Stat. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958).
7. Ibid.
8. See, Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract, 48 COLUM.
L. REv. 839 (1948).
9. Ibid.
NOTES
ment may be resolved.1" Justice Rutledge thus distinguished between
collective bargaining and the resolution of grievance in Elgin, Joliet &
Eastern Ry. v. Burley:"
[I]t is precisely the difference between making settlements ef-
fective only for the future and making them effective retro-
actively to conclude rights claimed as having already accrued
which marks the statutory boundary between collective bargain-
ing and the settlement of grievances.
The Elgin case was decided under the provisions of the Railway Labor
Act which provides for the adjustment of grievances. The distinction
between collective bargaining and grievance settlement is not as sharp or
as clearly defined under the NLRA." The grievance procedure, for in-
stance, is often considered to be nothing more than a continuation of col-
lective bargaining. 3 Moreover, the parties to the agreement may deter-
mine to exclude certain subjects from the grievance procedure and so
specify in the agreement.1 4 These so-called "management prerogative"
clauses are an example of the attempt by management to prevent certain
"basic" rights from being subjected to the grievance mill. The fact re-
mains that the grievance procedure, be it a continuation of the collective
bargaining process or a forum for the interpretation of the existing
agreement, provides an effective mechanism for the determination of
rights within the framework of the collective bargaining system.
From the above, it can be concluded that the collective bargaining
agreement, although perhaps capable of being fitted into the traditional
concept of a contract," is more than a contract." It is an attempt to cre-
ate a system by which the employer-employee relationship can be gov-
erned-a system which has been characterized as the "autonomous rule
of law and reason."' 7  Central to the proper functioning of this "autono-
mous rule of law" is the collective bargaining process and the grievance
procedure. Both labor and management have resort to the courts for the
enforcement of their rights under the agreement, but it is only when the
10. See, Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv.
999 (1955).
11. 325 U.S. 711, 739 (1945), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 (1945).
12. Compare, Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601, 638
(1955-56).
13. See Ryder, supra note 3.
14. See Shulman, supra note 10 at 1009.
15. See Cox, Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1958).
16. See Chamberlain, supra note 8; Shulman, supra note 10.
17. Shulman, supra note 10 at 1007.
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system breaks down completely that such resort is necessary or even de-
sirable. 8 Such a breakdown occurred in the Glidden case.
THE DISPUTE AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
The collective bargaining agreement in the Glidden case contained a
standard seniority clause which provided that layoffs would be by reverse
order of seniority. An employee with five or more years of continuous
employment was entitled to reemployment if an opening occurred within
three years after he was laid off. The agreement did not provide for the
disposition of this right to reemployment in the event of a termination
of the collective bargaining agreement or in the event of a relocation of
the plant. The preamble to the contract merely provided that the agree-
ment was made and entered into by the employer "for and on behalf of
its plant facilities located at Corina Avenue and 94th Street, Elmhurst,
Long Island, New York."' 9  It would thus appear that the specific situa-
tion that gave rise to litigation in the Glidden case was not provided for
in the collective bargaining agreement. The agrement did contain an
arbitration clause as the culmination of a five step grievance procedure."0
On September 16, 1957, Glidden, in accordance with the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement, notified the union in writing of its
intention to terminate the agreement and of its plans to transfer opera-
tions from its present plant in Elmhurst, to its newly constructed plant in
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Whether or not Glidden undertook to bar-
gain with the union concerning the contemplated move and the effect
of the move upon the tenure of the Elmhurst employees is not clear from
the record. Glidden did offer to consider applications for employment
of its former employees at the Bethlehem plant, but the offer was con-
ditional upon application being made at the Bethlehem plant and with the
understanding that it would be considered only on the same basis as that
18. As stated by Dean Harry Shulman:
When it works fairly well, it does not need the sanction of the law of contracts
or the law of arbitration. It is only when the system breaks down completely
that the courts' aid in these respects is involved. But the courts cannot, by oc-
casional sporadic decision, restore the parties continuing relationship; and their
intervention in such cases may seriously affect the going systems of self govern-
ment. When their autonomous system breaks down, might not the parties better
be left to the usual methods for adjustment of labor disputes rather than to
court actions on the contract or on the arbitration award? I suggest that the
law stay out-, but, mind you, not the lawyer.
Shulman, supra note 10 at 1024.
19. Zdanok v. Glidden, 288 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1961).
20. "Any question, grievance or dispute arising out of and involving the interpreta-
tion and application of the specific terms of this Agreement . . . shall, at the request of
either party, be referred to the New York State Mediation Board for arbitration." Id.
at 101.
NOTES
of a new applicant. It was this proviso of the offer that prompted the
dispute.
The union, on behalf of the employees, first sought relief through
arbitration in accordance with the arbitration provision of the collective
bargaining agreement. It served notice on Glidden of its intention to
submit six separate disputes to the New York State Board of Mediation
for arbitration."' Thereupon, Glidden petitioned for the Special Term of
the Supreme Court of New York for a stay of arbitration ". . . upon
the ground that the alleged disputes sought to be arbitrated are not ar-
bitrable under the collective bargaining agreement between the parties to
this proceeding."2"
The court upheld the position of Glidden to the effect that the dis-
putes did not involve, in the language of the arbitration clause, ". . . any
question, grievance or dispute arising out of and involving the interpreta-
tion and application of the specific terms of this Agreement.. ,,.
The court distinguished the arbitration clause in the agreement from
those arbitration clauses which use the phrase "any and all controversies
arising out of the contract" or "any and all controversies in connection
with the contract." The latter are frequently found in collective bargain-
ing agreements and would have been sufficient, in the courts view, to
embrace the matters in dispute. But in the absence of such an all inclu-
sive phrase, and in that the union could not point to any specific provi-
sion in the agreement which provided for continued employment with
full seniority beyond the expiration date of the agreement, the court con-
cluded that the "disputes" were not arbitrable and granted Glidden's mo-
tion for a stay.
Since the New York Supreme Court handed down its decision, the
role of the courts in the settlement of arbitration disputes has been given
21. The disputes which the Union desired to be arbitrated were summarized by the
court as follows:
Whether the collective bargaining agreement between the parties provides for
(1) a welfare plan, (2) a pension plan and (3) a group insurance plan which
create property rights for the employees which were breached by the discontinu-
ance of Glidden's plant at Elmhurst without first offering to each employee
continued employment with full seniority. The remaining three issues sought
to be arbitrated are (4) whether the discontinuance of the Glidden plant at
Elmhurst without offering to each employee continued employment with full
seniority was a breach of the collective bargaining agreement; (5) whether such
discontinuance was designed to avoid, evade, disrupt and 'breach Glidden's con-
tractual obligations to the Union and its employees and to prevent collective
bargaining in violation of law; and (6) whether the employees . . . were
discriminated against, solely by reason of their Union status .
The court dismissed "disputes" (5) and (6) as involving allegations of unfair labor
practices within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. Matter of Gen. Warehouse-
men's Union, 10 Misc. 2d 700, 172 N.Y.S. 2d 678 (1958).
22. Id. at 702, 172 N.Y.S. 2d at 679.
23. Zdanok v. Glidden, 288 F.2d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 1961) (Emphasis added).
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somewhat clearer definition by the United States Supreme Court. In
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,2 the Court held that under Section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act, a union could bring suit to en-
force an arbitration provision of a collective bargaining agreement. In
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co.,2  however, the
Court made it clear that its function was very limited in this area. As
stated by the Court, "It is confined to ascertaining whether the party
seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by
the contract. ' 2' The role of the court would thus seem to be restricted to
that of determining arbitrability. United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. 2 1 goes one step further. In a suit brought
under Section 301 of the LMRA, the Court said:
Apart from matters that the parties specifically exclude, all of
the questions on which the parties disagree must therefore come
within the scope of the grievance and arbitration provisions of
the collective agreement. . . . An order to arbitrate the par-
ticular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible
of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts
should be resolved in favor of coverage.28
Both of the above decisions concerned collective bargaining agree-
ments with arbitration clauses broader than that contained in the Glid-
den agreement. Nevertheless, there is in these decisions an unmistakable
shift in emphasis from that of the New York court, which placed the
burden on the moving party to point out the specific terms of the agree-
ment which would bring the disputed claim within the arbitration provi-
sion of the contract. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, would place
the burden on the opposing party to point out a provision in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement which would specifically exclude the matter
from arbitration. Unless clearly excluded by the terms of the agreement,
the issue should be resolved in favor of arbitrability. This is a signifi-
cant shift in emphasis which, if anticipated by the New York court,
could have resulted in arbitration in the dispute between Glidden and the
union.
SENIORITY RIGHTS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The union was thus thwarted in its attempt to utilize the grievance
machinery established by the agreement to resolve its dispute with man-
24. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
25. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
26. Id. at 568.
27. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
28. Id. at 581.
386
NOTES
agement. There remained, however, the possibility of settlement through
the process of collective bargaining; for Glidden, despite there being valid
economic reasons for relocating, remained under a duty to bargain with
the union ". .. concerning the effect of moving upon the tenure of
the . . . employees." 29  Failure to do so has been held to be an unfair
labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) of the LMRA.3 °
The duty of the employer to bargain with the union about the effect
of relocation upon the employees' tenure, like the duty to bargain about
".. . wages, hours, and other conditions of employment," would seem to
provide the union with an opportunity to protect the rights of the em-
ployees under the contract. From the union's standpoint, however, an ef-
fective resolution of the dispute is dependent upon its bargaining power,
without which the duty of the employer to bargain is not very meaning-
ful. This is particularly true in any dispute involving seniority rights,
since prior to the Glidden case seniority rights were not considered
"vested" property rights but were dependent upon the bargaining power
of the union for their continued value to the employee."'
The majority of disputes relating to seniority arise and are settled
within the framework of the collective bargaining system.32 Moreover,
with few exceptions, cases in which it has been found necessary to resort
to the courts have been been decided with reference to the workings of the
collective bargaining system. Seldom, as in Glidden, have the courts been
called upon to determine the status of seniority rights divorced from the
processes of collective bargaining and the grievance procedure.3" This
fact has been primarily responsible for the legal status accorded to senior-
ity rights prior to the Glidden case.
Seniority and the Bargaining Contract. The courts have been uni-
form in holding that seniority rights are not inherent in the employer-
employee relationship, but are contract rights dependent upon the terms
of the existing collective bargaining agreement for their legal vitality.3"
29. Bickford Shoe Inc., 109 NLRB 1346 (1954) ; accord, NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d
886 (9th Cir. 1957) ; NLRB v. Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 222 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1955) ;
Rapid Bindery, Inc., 127 NLRB 212 (1960); Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106
NLRB 999 (1953); Rome Products Co., 77 NLRB 1217 (1948); contra, NLRB v. New
Madrid Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1954).
30. Cases cited note 29 snpra.
31. Cases cited note 2 supra.
32. See generally Comment, Seniority Rights and Labor Relations, 47 YALE L.J. 73(1937-38).
33. Cf. Wagner v. Puget Sound & Light Co., 41 Wash. 2d 306, 248 P.2d 1084
(1952), in which the court said, "In all of the cases where seniority as a property right
has been considered, the employer was a going concern and able to recognize and accord
to the employee his contractual seniority rights."
34. See e.g., Starke v. N.Y., Chicago & St. Louis R.R., 180 F.2d 569 (7th Cir.
1950); Elder v. New York Cent. R.R., 152 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1945); Zdero v. Briggs
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
As stated by the court in Elder v. New York Cent. R.R. :
In the absence of a statute, mere employment independent of the
contractual conferring of special benefits upon those who have
longest service records with the individual employer, creates no
rights of seniority in retention in service or in re-employment.
Once defined and embodied in the agreement, seniority rights inure to the
benefit of the individual employees. Because they are drivative from the
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the employer and the union,
various theories have been advanced to explain the individual employee's
.status vis a vis these seniority rights. Whatever the rationale, the courts
are in accord in holding that the individual may bring suit to enforce his
seniority rights in accordance with the terms of the contract.39  More-
over, seniority rights are considered valuable property rights within the
meaning of the fifth amendment. 7 Seniority rights, however, are not
considered to be "vested" rights in the sense that they cannot be altered
without the express consent of the individual possessing them.8" Just as
the parties to the collective bargaining agreement have the power to create
seniority rights, the parties likewise have the power to modify them.
Modification is subject only to the requirement of fair representation."
The requirement of fair representation has meant that certain mini-
mal procedural standards be observed in the operation of the grievance
machinery. It has thus been held a violation of due process to fail to
notify an individual of a hearing at which the status of his seniority was
being determined." Beyond this, however, the requirement of fair rep-
resentation has meant little more than that the modification of rights be
made in good faith and for the benefit of the majority.4' Barring fraud
Mfg. Co., 338 Mich. 549, 61 N.W.2d 615 (1953); Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R., 267
Mich. 202, 225 N.W. 365 (1934).
35. 152 F.2d 361, 364 (6th Cir. 1945).
36. See Cox, .supra note 12 at 646.
37. Nord v. Griffen, 86 F.2d 481 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 673 (1936);
Primakow v. Railway Express Agency, 56 F. Supp. 413 (D.C. Wis. 1943); Clark v.
Hem-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 317 (1959).
38. See e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1952); NLRB v. Whe-
land Co., 271 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1959) ; Holman v. Industrial Stamping Co., 344 Mich.
235 (1955); Hartley v. Brotherhood of Ry. Employees, 283 Mich. 201, 217 N.W. 885
(1938) ; Leeder v. Cities Service Oil Co., 199 Okla. 618, 189 P.2d 189 (1948) ; O'Donnell
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 12 Wis.2d 491, 107 N.W.2d 484 (1961).
39. Cf. Cox, suspra note 12; Cox, The Duty of Fair Representatio, 2 VILL. L. REv.
151 (1957).
40. Nord v. Griffen, 86 F.2d 481 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 637 (1936).
41. In Hartley v. Brotherhood of Ry. Employees, the employer and the union en-
tered into agreement whereby when economic conditions necessitated a reduction in per-
sonnel, married women were to be relieved from service in the absence of extenuating
circumstances. Plaintiff brought suit against the union basing her claim on her seniority
rights. The court upheld the validity of the agreement saying:
The seniority rights acquired by her did not arise 'by virtue of her contract of
NOTES
or arbitrary action on the part of the union the courts will usually not in-
terfere with the determination or adjustment of seniority rights. As
stated in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman:
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which
the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual em-
ployees. . The complete satisfaction of all who are repre-
sented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness
must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving
the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and
honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.42
It can thus be concluded that, subject only to "complete good faith and
honesty of purpose," it is within the discretion of the union to modify,
or even bargain away completely an employee's seniority rights without
the express consent of the employee.
One additional aspect of the legal status of seniority rights needs
emphasis in order to place the Glidden case in proper perspective. Unlike
other rights "earned" under the collective bargaining agreement, i.e., sev-
erance pay, vacation pay and pension rights, seniority rights have been
held limited to the duration of the collective bargaining agreement which
created them. 3 As stated by the court in System Fed'n of Ry. Employees
v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry. :"
On this point the authorities are uniform. They settle it that
collective bargaining agreements do not create a permanent
status, give an indefinite tenure, or extend rights created and
arising under the contract, beyond its life, when it has been ter-
minated in accordance with its provisions. The rights of the
parties to work under the contract are fixed by the contract.
They persist during, they end with, its term.
Seniority rights, in other words, are not considered to be "vested" in the
employee beyond the expiration date of any one agreement. They "sur-
vive" the contract only to the extent that any modification in subsequent
employment with her employer, but existed by reason of the agreement . . .
between the railway and the brotherhood. This agreement was executed for the
benefit of all the members of the brotherhood and not for th individual benefit
of plaintiff. . . . The brotherhood had the power . . . to modify or destroy
these rights in the interest of all the members.
283 Mich. 201, 206, 277 N.W. 885, 887 (1938).
42. 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1952).
43. See generally Note, Termination of Collective Bargaining Agreements-Survi-
val of Earned Rights, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 646 (1959-60), and cases cited therein.
44. 119 F.2d 509 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 656 (1941). Accord, Mc-
Mullans v. Kansas, Okla. & Gulf Ry., 229 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1956) ; Lewellyn v. Fleming
154 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1946).
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collective bargaining must be made in good faith and not so as to arbi-
trarily deprive the individual of his seniority status. Unless otherwise
provided for in the agreement, the continued value of seniority rights to
the individual employee is dependent upon the successful re-negotiation
of the collective bargaining agreement by the union. The importance of
the economic power of the union to the survival of seniority rights is
therefore evident.
In a much more fundamental way, however, the continued value of
seniority rights to the employee is dependent upon the continued existence
of an employment relationship; for the employer-employee relationship
is essential to the operation of the collective bargaining system. Within
this relationship the union can effectively exercise its economic power.
Backed by the economic weapon of the strike, the union is in a position to
protect the seniority rights of the employees. The prospect of a continu-
ing employment relationship provides the union with sufficient leverage
that by threatening economic reprisal it can safeguard any arbitrary ac-
tion on the part of the employer. But what is there to prevent the em-
ployer from depriving the union of this requisite leverage by unilaterally
terminating the collective bargaining agreement, moving the plant to an-
other location and thereby destroying the employment relationship? This
is the issue raised by the Glidden case.
Preventing a Unilateral Termination of Seniority. There would
seem to be three safeguards preventing the employer from embarking
upon such action: (1) a provision in the collective bargaining agreement
providing for the eventuality of plant removal; (2) the requirement that
the move be undertaken for valid economic reasons and not with the ob-
ject of interfering with the rights of the employees protected by the
LMRA;" aid (3) the duty of the employer, despite there being valid
economic reasons for moving, to bargain with the union about the move
and its effect upon the tenure of the employees." As has been noted, the
parties to the Glidden contract failed to provide for the possibility of
plant removal. In addition, Glidden was not a "runaway shop"-that is,
the move was apparently undertaken for valid economic reasons and the
45. If the object or effect of the relocation is to interfere with the rights of the
employees protected by the LMRA, then the employer commits an unfair labor practice
by moving the plant. See NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957); NLRB v.
Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 222 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Rome Products Co., 77 NLRB
1213 (1948). If there are valid economic reasons for the move, then the employer can
usually avoid the charge of being a "runaway shop" and of committing an unfair labor
practice. See NLRB v. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1954) ; Mount
Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1954); E-Z Mills Inc., 106 NLRB
1039 (1953) ; Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co. 106 NLRB 999 (1953).
46. Cases cited note 29 supra.
NOTES
possibility of an unfair practice was not raised in the federal courts." In
this sense, the moving of the plant was not arbitrary. The employer,
nevertheless, was able to terminate the collective bargaining agreement
and deprive the employes of their expected security of tenure, despite
the duty to bargain with the union about the prospective move.4" The
meaningfulness of the duty to bargain is thus brought into question.
More precisely, the question would seem to be whether the union has
sufficient economic power at this stage of employer-employee relations
to make the duty of the employer to bargain meaningful; or whether the
duty to bargain is nothing more than a procedural formality to which the
employer must submit in order to avoid the charge of an unfair labor
practice. 9
In Bickford Sioe Inc., the NLRB took the position that the duty
to bargain with the union about plant removal did not involve a duty to
acquiesce in the union's demands. While it is an unfair practice to re-
fuse to discuss the subject of plant removal with the union, there is no
47. The plaintiffs in Glidden apparently decided to drop charges of an unfair prac-
tice as a result of the finding of the Special Term of the New York Supreme Court that
such charges were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. It is interesting to
note that in a situation similar to that found in Glidden the General Counsel refused to
issue a complaint upon the union's allegation of an unfair practice. The fact that the
company had entered into an agreement with the chamber of commerce of a city located
in another state for construction of a new plant, plus lower yearly rent and tax ad-
vantages was held to be sufficient economic reason for moving to the new situs and
discharging the employees at the old plant. Case No. SR-998, 47 LRRM 1053 (1960);
accord, Case No. SR-1369, 48 LRRM 1264 (1961).
48. The employer, in other words, by his unilateral act of terminating the collective
bargaining agreement was able to force the employees to resort to the courts for a de-
termination of their rights. Even then the employees were only able to obtain damages
as compensation for their expected security of tenure. In the unfair practice, "runaway
shop" cases the courts are in the process of developing an effective remedy against plant
removal. See United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg., Co., 187 F. Supp. 509 (E.D.
Pa. 1960) (Employer given choice of returning to the old situs or of paying twenty
years union dues plus $50,000 punitive damages) ; Rome Products Co., 77 NLRB 1217
(1948) (Employer given choice of returning to the old plant situs or of offering re-
emplcyment to the old employees at the new plant with back pay plus paying for reason-
able moving expenses for the employees from the old situs to the new). Absent an un-
fair practice, however, it is at least questionable whether damages for a breach of con-
tract are a sufficient deterrent to prevent the employer from undertaking a plant re-
moval and denying his former employees reemployment at the new plant.
49. This is not to suggest that the employer can enter into collective bargaining
with the union about plant removal with the attitude that it is nothing more than a pro-
cedural formality. Although difficult of assessment, there is a subjective as well as an
objective standard of good faith to which the parties engaged in collective bargaining
must conform. Under the requirements of the NLRA, both labor and management must
approach collective bargaining with an "open and fair mind" in an "honest and sincere"
endeavor to reach agreement. Mere pretended bargaining does not suffice to satisfy this
requirement. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943). It is
suggested, however, that in bargaining about plant removal at this stage of employer-
employee relations the union is dependent entirely upon the good faith of the employer
and that the union is not in a position to effectively induce concessions from the em-
ployer by the use of its economic power.
50. 109 NLRB 1346 (1954).
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sanction for not acceding to the requests of the union. Plant removal is,
then, a mandatory subject of bargaining. Like any other mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining, it is a subject which the parties must approach in
good faith, but about which they may bargain to impasse. The only af-
firmative duty on either party is to bargain in good faith in an attempt
to reach agreement. There is no requirement that the dispute be re-
solved one way or the other. In such a situation, it is submitted, the eco-
nomic or bargaining power of the parties is the determining factor in the
resolution of the disputed claim. In the case of plant removal, the eco-
nomic power of the union is the determining factor.
In negotiations relating to plant removal, the bargaining power of
the union would appear to be non-existent. This is especially true at the
old plant situs, for a strike by its nature is not suited to preventing an
employer from closing down his operations. The union's only remain-
ing weapon, then, is picketing the employer at the new plant situs. This,
too, would appear to be ineffectual at a situs relatively far removed from
the old plant, as practical considerations prevent picketing from being
effective in such a situation. This would be true particularly when it is
considered that the object of the picketing is to gain employment at the
expense of those already employed at the new plant. As a minimum, the
efforts of a well organized national union would be required to induce
concessions from the employer. Even then, provisions of the LMRA
may serve to prevent effective economic action from being taken (assum-
ing that, as in Glidden, the employer has committed no unfair practice in
moving the plant to the new situs). Unless the union can show that it
represents a majority of the employees at the new plant, or has complied
with the requirements of section 8(b) (7) of the act,5 it may be charged
with an unfair labor practice. The difficult situation is presented by the
removal of a plant to a situs not far removed from the old location where
there remains some doubt as to the duty of the employer to bargain with
the old bargaining representatives.
51. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 544 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. II 1959-60). In New York picketing an employer's offices after
the employer for valid economic reasons moved his plant to another state was held to be
enjoinable because the object of the picketing was considered unlawful. Freydberg, Inc.
v. Ladies' Garment Workers, 33 LRRM 3402 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954). Similarly, it has
been held that the New York Anti-Injunction Act does not prevent the issuing of an
injunction against a union picketing the plant of the employer in an attempt to prevent
the employer from moving his plant to another locaiton. Englander Co. v. Tisbler, 33
LRRM 2753 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1954); Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Brewery Workers, Local
1059, 35 LRRM 2740 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955). The apparent theory behind these cases is
that the employer has the right to terminate his business and the exercise of that right
precludes there being a labor dispute within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act.
See American Type Founders, Inc. v. Webendorfer-Wills Employees Ass'n, 35 LRRM
2336 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
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Removal to ct Nearby Situs. The law in this area of plant removal
is far from settled. Moreover, almost without exception, the cases are
predicated upon the charge of an unfair labor practice and may be dis-
tinguished from Glidden. Nevertheless, in that the basic inquiry in these
cases is directed to determining whether or not the employer is under a
duty to bargain with the old representative at the new plant situs, the
cases are instructive. If the employer remains under such a duty it may
be assumed that the union can employ its economic weapons without be-
ing subject to a charge of an unfair labor practice.
A relocation of a plant in and of itself does not relieve the employer
from the duty to bargain with the designated bargaining unit at the old
plant. As stated by the NLRB in General Extrusion Co. :52
[A] mere relocation of operations accompanied by a transfer of
a considerable proportion of employees to another plant, with-
out an accompanying change in the character of the jobs and the
function of the employees in the contract unit, does not remove
a contract as a bar. 3
The old contract, in other words, may be held to carry over to the new
plant and bar a representation election, thereby requiring the employer
to bargain with the union elected by the employees at the old plant.
Similarly, the employer may be under a duty to bargain with the old
representative if a sufficient number of the old employees accompany the
plant to the new situs. As pointed out by the court in NLRB v. Lewis :
But in these plant removal cases, after finding the duty to bar-
gain about the removal, the board swerves one way when it
thinks a majority of the local's employees would not have moved
away, and another when it assumes that they would have moved.
In the Lewis case, the court upheld the majority position of the board to
the effect that, but for an unfair labor practice of the employer, a ma-
jority of the employees would have moved with the plant.5" Based upon
52. 121 NLRB 1165 (1958).
53. Id. at 1167; accord, Yale Rubber Mfg. Co., 85 NLRB 131 (1949).
54. 246 F.2d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 1957).
55. In its opinion, the board stated:
The interpretation which our dissenting colleague places upon the Browm case
(Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 NLRB 999 (1953)) would in effect
establish an inflexible rule that the removal of a plant for economic reasons, no
matter what the circumstance surrounding the move, terminates any pre-existing
obligation to bargain with the employees' representative, which obligation is not
revived unless that representative establishes a new majority at the new location.
We cannot agree that such a result is either required by the Act or is necessary
in order to effectuate its policies. California Footwear Co., 114 NLRB 765
(1955).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
this assumption, the refusal of the employer to bargain with the union
at the new plant situs was held to be an unfair labor practice within the
meaning of section 8(a) (5).
Thus it would seem that the union, in order to establish its authority
as the bargaining representative at the new plant, must be able to show
not only that a large percentage of the old employees moved with the
plant, but that this percentage constitutes a majority of the employees at
the new location.5" As is readily seen, such a requirement in the Glidden
type situation merely begs the question. This is the very issue in dispute,
i.e., whether the employer is under a duty to hire the old employees at the
new plant with their old seniority status. If the union must establish it-
self as the designated bargaining unit at the new plant situs before it can
bring economic pressure to bear upon the employer, then it is precluded
from effectively bargaining with the employer; for the employer may
lawfully refuse employment to the old employees and in so doing deny
the union the requisite basis of economic action at the new plant situs. It
can thus be concluded that the bargaining power of the union is almost
non-existent. The tenure of the employees and the continued value of
their seniority rights is dependent solely upon the good faith of the
employer for any equitable adjustment. Seen in this light, the duty of
the employer to bargain with the union about plant removal and its effect
upon the tenure of the employees would appear to be little more than a
procedural formality.
THE EMPLOYEES' ACTION FOR DAMAGES
As noted above, it is not clear whether Glidden did undertake to
bargain with the union about the proposed move. It is clear, however,
that if any bargaining did take place, the union was unsuccessful in gain-
ing any concessions from the employer. Having failed to obtain relief
It is possible to construe this passage to mean, as the dissent did, that the employer may
be under a duty to bargain with the old bargaining unit at the new plant situs despite
there being valid economic reasons for moving and despite the absence of an unfair labor
practice. The Circuit Court of Appeals, in enforcing the order of the board, clarified
the issue when it said:
We believe that the majority members of the National Labor Relations Board
do not really deny here the contention of Acting Chairman Rodgers that unfair
labor practices after the closing of the plant . . . must stand on two legs:
1. The prior refusal to bargain about transferring employees from Los Angeles
to Venice.
2. The assumption that most of local's employees would have transferred to
Venice and thus preserved local's majority had it not been for the refusal to
bargain about transfer of employees. NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir.
1957).
56. Plaintiff's counsel conceded to the trial court that even if all the Elmhurst em-
ployees had transferred to the new plant, Local 852 could not have continued as the
accredited bargaining representative. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 185 F. Supp. 441, 448
n. 26 (1960).
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through the process of collective bargaining and through the grievance
procedure, the union in effect exhausted its "remedies" within the frame-
work of the collective bargaining system. Furthermore, as seniority
rights are considered to be uniquely personal rights within the meaning
of Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.,"7 the union was precluded from taking any further action
on behalf of the employees in regard to seniority rights. The only re-
course left to the individual employees was to bring an action on their
own behalf."5
Several aspects of the court's opinion should be noted." In the first
place, the court refused to base its opinion on the specific provisions of
the seniority clause. The collective bargaining agreement was for a two
year period but contained a three year layoff provision for employees
with five or more years of seniority. Conceivably, the court could have
construed this provision of the contract as implying the survial of senior-
ity rights beyond the expiration date of the agreement. The court, how-
ever, chose not to limit itself to this specific provision of the contract,
but framed the holding in much broader terms.
Equating seniority rights to "valuable unemployment insurance" and
analogizing them to pension rights, the court held that the plaintiffs
" . had . . . 'earned' their valuable unemployment insurance, and
that their rights in it were 'vested' and could not be unilaterally an-
nulled."'" The fact that the plant had been moved to another location
should not alter the status of these rights. There was no reason, in the
57. 348 U.S. 437 (1954), petition for rehearing denied, 349 U.S. 925 (1954). In
Westinghouise, the Court held that a union could not bring suit under § 301 (a) of the
LMR.A to enforce uniquely personal rights of the employees. In Local 2040 Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists v. Servel, Inc., seniority rights were held to be uniquely personal rights.
268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1959). Despite this distinction between "individual" and "union"
rights, the dissent in Glidden was of the opinion that "the contract should be construed
in light of federal substantive law pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act. . . ." Zdanok v. Glidden, 288 F.2d 99, 105 (1961) (Dissenting opinion). In
that § 301 is only applicable to "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization. . . ." the conclusion of the dissenting judge would seem to be
in error. See LMRA § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958). Nevertheless,
a good case can be made to the effect that seniority rights are not uniquely personal
rights and that the union should be permitted to bring suit under § 301 on behalf of the
employees. Cf. Cox, supra note 12. In this respect, the Glidden case would appear to be
a good example of the "tension" which still exists between the Westinghouse decision
and Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
58. For an excellent analysis of the case, see 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1363 (1961).
59. The defendant Glidden Company, relying on Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156,
156 N.E.2d 297 (1959), contended that because the contract provided that disputes aris-
ing under the collective bargaining agreement be determined by arbitration the individual
employees were prohibited from bringing suit. The court, however, rejected this con-
tention citing the decision of the Special Term of the New York Supreme Court to the
effect that the dispute in question was not covered by the arbitration provision of the
contract. Zdanok v. Glidden, 288 F.2d 99, 102 (1961).
60. Zdanok v. Glidden, 288 F.2d 99, 103 (1961).
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opinion of the court, why a mere change in physical location should have
the effect of destroying an entire structure of valuable legal rights. The
court dismissed the reference to the Elmhurst location in the preamble of
the contract by saying: "A rational construction of the contract would
seem to require that the statement of location was nothing more than a
reference to the then existing situation. . . . ""' Any other construction,
the court reasoned, would be both "irrational and destructive." 2  The
opinion was thus framed more in terms of the reasonable expectations of
the plaintiffs than in terms of any specific provision of the contract.
Secondly, the court failed to cite any authority in support of its posi-
tion. In that the court was construing a particular contract, this fact
should not be considered prejudicial to the validity of the holding. Ad-
mittedly, the result was contrary to the generally accepted view of senior-
ity rights, but the case was decided in a context different from that of
the ordinary case involving seniority. The decision was not made with
reference to the rights of the parties within the framework of the collec-
tive bargaining system. It was made, instead, with reference to the
rights of the parties after the processes of collective bargaining and griev-
ance settlement were exhausted. Seniority, as a result, was accorded a
status which it had not previously enjoyed.
CONCLUSION
The Glidden case arose out of a situation which the parties failed to
anticipate or provide for in the collective bargaining agreement. More
important, it was a situation which the parties were unable to resolve
within the framework of the collective bargaining system through the
process of collective bargaining or the grievance procedure. That this
was so was due in part to the failure of the parties, especially the union,
to anticipate such a situation and provide for it in the agreement either
in the form of a broader arbitration clause or a provision covering the
specific situation. But to a much greater extent, the failure of the parties
to resolve the dispute was the result of the disintegration of the employ-
ment relationship, the medium essential to the operation of the collective
bargaining system. Because the union was unable to effectively exercise
its economic power, the duty of the employer to bargain with the union
about plant removal proved to be an ineffectual safeguard against uni-
lateral action on the part of the employer. The individual employees, as
a result, were forced to seek relief in a court of law. The Glidden deci-
sion, based on an interpretation of the specific collective bargaining agree-
61. Id. at 104.
62. Ibid.
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ment and not on the rights of the parties within the framework of the
system, was the result.
To say that the Glidden decision was a matter of contract interpreta-
tion is not to minimize its significance or its potential effect in the field
of labor relations. The case has already been cited in a similar plant re-
moval case 3 and would seem to have social and economic ramifications
far beyond the issue of the survival of seniority rights.64
It is suggested, however, that the most important consequence of the
Glidden decision will be to force the issue of plant removal and its effect
upon the rights of the parties under the agreement back into the frame-
work of the collective bargaining system. The employer desirous of
avoiding the result of the Glidden case will be required to raise the issue
of plant removal during contract negotiations in the attempt to incor-
porate a satisfactory resolution of the problem into the written agreement.
Ironically, however, the mere raising of the issue may be tantamount to
incorporating the result of the Glidden case into the agreement, because
(and this is the significant aspect of the Glidden decision) the employer
will be required to raise the issue at a time when the union is in a position
to employ its economic weapons in support of its demands, i.e., during
contract negotiations as opposed to immediately preceding the move. Un-
like the situation as it existed in Glidden, the effect of plant removal up-
on employee tenure will not be dependent upon the good faith of the em-
ployer, but upon the bargaining power of the union. In that the Glidden
decision places the burden on the employer not only to raise the issue of
plant removal, but also to resolve it, the bargaining advantage would
seem to be with the union. Seen in this light, Glidden appears to be an
important tactical victory for organized labor.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE INDIANA SUNDAY
CLOSING LAW
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court' indicate that
63. Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 195 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich. 1961). De-
fendant Ross Gear and Tool Co. announced to its employees its intention of closing
down operations at its Michigan division and moving to Tennessee, and of its plans to
terminate employment one month prior to the expiration date of the collective bargaining
agreement. A group of employees thereupon brought an action for declaratory relief
in the Federal District Court. The court relying solely on Glidden held that the em-
ployees were entitled to employment at the Tennessee plant by virtue of their seniority
rights.
64. Wall Street Journal, July 21, 1961, p. 1, col. 6.
1. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys From Harrison-
